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  The Livestock Mandatory Reporting Act (MPR) of 1999 was implemented in April 2001. Em-
pirical evidence indicates a significant change in intra-week price dispersion associated with 
publicly reported fed cattle grid premiums and discounts occurring after MPR implementation. 
    The research objective is to evaluate the effect of increased market transparency resulting 
from implementation of MPR, on grid intra-week premium and discount dispersion levels. Em-
pirical results suggest that increased transparency is compatible with intra-week dispersion 
levels increasing. Increased dispersion suggests that during the pre-MPR period weekly pre-
mium and discount data may have been drawn from a non-representative sample. From the 
empirical evidence, it is concluded that reform of the livestock price-reporting system appears 
to have been necessary in the case of publically reported grid premiums and discounts. 
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The Livestock Mandatory Reporting Act (MPR) 
of 1999 was implemented in April 2001. Discus-
sion in the fed cattle marketing literature suggests 
that increased industrial concentration in the pack-
ing and feedlot industries, and increased use of 
captive supply procurement methods, were the 
primary causes of the Voluntary Price Reporting 
(VPR) system’s failure to provide accurate and 
timely market information to market participants, 
i.e., a lack of market transparency (e.g., Anderson 
et al. 1998, Wachenheim and DeVuyst 2001). 
  In the literature discussing the economic impli-
cations of MPR, the inverse relationship between 
market transparency and transaction price disper-
sion is discussed within the context of price 
uncertainty for market participants (i.e., Azzam 
2003). Azzam’s discussion of declining price dis-
persion, as a result of MPR implementation, is 
equivalent to a decline in the variance of a ran-
dom variable’s probability density function. A de-
cline in the variance of a random variable’s prob-
ability density function is analogous to the neo-
classical definition of a decrease in price uncer-
tainty (e.g., Sandmo 1971). This view of the rela-
tionship between transparency and price disper-
sion is also consistent with the discussion by 
Tomek (1980) on the inverse relationship be-
tween transaction price variance and the propor-
tion of transactions reported. 
  The U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Agricul-
tural Marketing Service (AMS) has been provid-
ing weekly grid price reports for slaughter cattle 
since October 1996. These reports provide the 
market with information on weekly premiums and 
discounts being paid by packing firms for car-
casses with specific quality grade, yield grade, 
and weight attributes (Fausti, Feuz, and Wagner 
1998). In effect, individual packer reported grid 
premiums and discounts are equivalent to market 
prices because the firm’s premium and discount 
schedule reflects the prices being paid for specific 
carcass attributes for a specific week. It is in this 
context that we are discussing price dispersion. 
Price dispersion, for our purpose, is defined as the 
intra-week price spread for a specific grid pre-
mium or discount between packing firms that are 
reporting their grid price schedules to the AMS. 
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  Prior to implementation of MPR, grid price 
reports were based on information collected from 
meat packing companies under a voluntary price-
reporting system. When the VPR system ended, 
six packing firms were providing weekly reports 
on premiums and discounts at the firm level. Un-
der MPR, all firms slaughtering over 125,000 ani-
mals annually are now required to report price in-
formation for each plant they operate. As a result, 
market transparency has increased due to (i) an 
increased number of firms reporting, and (ii) an 
increase in the accuracy of information being re-
ported by packing firms. 
 However,  the  AMS reports only the mean and 
statistical range for grid premiums and discounts 
for different categories on a weekly basis. The 
statistical range is a measure of dispersion. Time-
series data for the weekly range of reported grid 
premiums and discounts illustrate that the range 
actually increased after MPR implementation for 
all quality grade categories depicted in Figure 1. 
Yield grade categories and carcass weight dis-
count categories also display a similar pattern. 
  The empirical literature investigating the effect 
of structural reform of public price reporting of 
slaughter cattle prices on market transparency has 
focused on the cash markets with respect to live 
and dressed weight prices for finished cattle 
(Fausti and Diersen 2004, Pendell and Schroeder 
2006, Fausti, Diersen, and Qasmi 2007). These 
authors found no supporting statistical evidence 
to corroborate the view that there was a lack of 
market transparency in the fed cattle cash market 
prior to the implementation of MPR. 
 The  USDA’s Economic Research Service (ERS) 
released a study (Perry et al. 2005) on the effect 
of MPR on the fed cattle market. Two conclusions 
reached by Perry et al. (2005) in the ERS study 
are germane to the issue we address: (i) they con-
clude that “the mandatory data seem to better 
represent market conditions” (p. 1), and (ii) they 
report increased price volatility in the post-MPR 
period and state that this is an unexpected result 
(pp. 27–30). 
  The increase in the statistical range for premi-
ums and discounts, and the increase in cattle price 
volatility reported by the ERS, are not consistent 
with the predictions of the MPR literature related 
to the effect of increased transparency.
1 Neverthe-
                                                                                    
1 Price dispersion refers to distribution of transaction prices being 
reported by firms at period t. Increased dispersion refers to an expan-
sion of that distribution in period t + 1. The statistical range is a meas-  
less, increased transparency is the result of MPR. 
Therefore, an important question is raised: Is in-
creased transparency compatible with increased 
price dispersion? 
  This empirical puzzle highlights the need for 
additional inquiry into the relationship between 
increased market transparency and price disper-
sion. A formal hypothesis is introduced, linking 
the presence of a sampling bias in the VPR system 
for collecting data on grid premiums and dis-
counts to the unexpected presence of increased 
premium and discount dispersion in the post-MPR 
period. The conclusion drawn from this inquiry is 
that sample-selection bias in the pre-MPR period 
is a plausible explanation for the coexistence of 
increased market transparency and increased price 
dispersion in the post-MPR period. 
 




The development of a value-based marketing 
system for fed cattle has been a priority issue for 
the beef industry since the publication of The War 
on Fat by the Value Based Marketing Taskforce 
(VBMTF) in 1990.
2 Today the most successful 
form of value-based marketing (VBM) for cattle is 
referred to as “grid pricing” (Fausti, Feuz, and 
Wagner 1998).
3 
                                                                                    
ure of dispersion. Price volatility refers to the fluctuation in the price 
level of a commodity. An increase in price volatility indicates an in-
crease in price level variation at period t + 1 relative to period t. Azzam 
(2003) and Tomek (1980) both discuss transparency in the context of 
price dispersion, not price volatility. Changes in grid premium and dis-
count volatility can be investigated by comparing the standard devia-
tion of the weekly reported grid premium or discount mean () χ for the 
pre-MPR period to the post-MPR period. Price volatility is not the 
issue being investigated in this paper, but increased price dispersion, if 
persistent over time, may result in increased price volatility.  
2 In the late 1980s, the National Cattlemen’s Beef Association (NCBA) 
sanctioned the formation of the Valued Based Marketing Taskforce to 
study the competitive position of beef. The taskforce issued a white 
paper in 1990 titled The War on Fat. The taskforce identified average 
pricing of slaughter cattle in the cash market as a major barrier to the 
transmission of consumer preferences for leaner beef product with 
greater quality consistency back to the producer via the price mecha-
nism. For an expanded discussion on the issue of value-based market-
ing for slaughter cattle, see Cross and Savell (1994) and Fausti, Feuz, 
and Wagner (1998). 
3 Grid pricing typically accesses carcass premiums and discounts 
based on carcass quality grade, carcass yield grade, and hot carcass 
weight. The concept of grid pricing evolved from the traditional grade 
and yield pricing system. The AMS weekly public report provides 
prices for quality grade (prime, select, standard), yield grade (Yg 1.0–
2.0, Yg 2.0–2.5, Yg 2.5–3.0, Yg 3.0–3.5, Yg 3.5–4.0, Yg 4.0–5.0, Yg > 
5), and weight discounts based on hot carcass weight (400–500, 500–
550, 950–1000, and over 1,000 lbs). Fausti et al.  The Effect of the Livestock Mandatory Reporting Act on Market Transparency and Grid Price Dispersion   459 
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Figure 1. Changes in Premiums and Discounts for Quality Grades 
Note: Time-series graphics reflect the maximum, average, and minimum values of the data, respectively. 
 
  The focus in the grid-pricing literature has been 
on the incentive structure of grid pricing relative 
to average pricing of slaughter cattle, and its po-
tential success in supplanting the average pricing 
alternative (e.g., Johnson and Ward 2005, Fausti 
and Qasmi 2002, Feuz 1999, Fausti and Feuz 460    October 2010  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
1995). Feuz (1999) estimated that there were at 
least 25 different price grids being used by the 
packing industry shortly after the AMS began is-
suing public grid price reports. He points out that 
packer premium and discount schedules vary 
across firms. He also discussed the practice of 
large packing firms adjusting their grid premium 
and discount schedules based on plant averages. 
His discussion of the differences across grid-
pricing mechanisms indicates that premiums and 
discounts not only vary across firms but can also 
vary across plants within a firm. Feuz’s discus-
sion of packing industry pricing practices sug-
gests that pre-MPR public reports of weekly grid 
prices may not have fully captured the market 




The impetus for imposing MPR in U.S. livestock 
markets was generated by beef industry interest 
groups (producer groups, livestock economists, 
and government officials) who believed that VPR 
had become an ineffective public information 
mechanism for providing transparency in live-
stock markets. Recent empirical studies, however, 
suggest that MPR has only marginally improved 
transparency in the fed cattle cash market (Grune-
wald, Schroeder, and Ward 2004, Fausti and Dier-
sen 2004, Pendell and Schroeder 2006, Fausti, 
Diersen, and Qasmi 2007). Accordingly, these re-
search findings suggest that the VPR system was 
not as inefficient as alluded to in the earlier litera-
ture, but the general consensus is that MPR has 
had a positive effect on the level of transparency 
in the slaughter cattle market (e.g., Perry et al. 
2005, Ward 2006). 
  Previous empirical studies examining the time-
series behavior of grid price series (VPR  and 
MPR) suggest that there is evidence of an increase 
in premium and discount variability after MPR 
implementation (Priebe 2004, Hogan and Ward 
2005). Increased premium and discount volatility 
in the post-MPR period is contrary to the expecta-
tions for volatility prior to the implementation of 
MPR. Perry et al. (2005, pp. 28–30) provide a set 
of ad hoc possibilities for increased volatility in 
the post-MPR era, but conclude that “Current re-
search is not able to identify the source of this 
increased volatility.” 
Public Livestock Price Reporting by the AMS 
 
Each week the AMS reports the mean and the 
statistical range for each grid premium and dis-
count category. The premiums or discounts re-
vealed by the surveyed packers to the AMS under 
VPR, and the reporting packers under MPR, re-
flect what individual packers are going to pay for 
the coming week. This process holds true for both 
VPR and MPR. 
 
Grid Price-Reporting Mechanism under VPR  
 
Under the VPR system, on Monday morning the 
AMS office in Des Moines, Iowa, contacted each 
packer on its survey list and collected information 
on the packer’s discount and premium schedule 
for the coming week. Packing firms reported firm-
level premium and discount schedules. The vol-
untary nature of the reporting precluded any au-
diting or verification procedures. In the last year 
of VPR, six packing firms were voluntarily report-
ing premium and discount schedules to the AMS 
on a weekly basis.
4 In the year 2000, the four and 
eight largest packing firms accounted for 81 
percent and 90 percent of total steer and heifer 
slaughter, respectively (USDA 2004, p. 44). 
 
Grid Price-Reporting Mechanism under MPR 
 
After MPR implementation, the St. Joseph, Mis-
souri, office of the AMS was given the responsi-
bility of collecting packer grid premium and dis-
count data. The St. Joseph office considers its 
premium and discount reports to be distinctly dif-
ferent from the reports issued under the old 
reporting regime (VPR). Packers under MPR are 
required to submit a “Cattle Premiums and Dis-
count Weekly Report” (form # LS-117) by 9 am 
central on the first reporting day of the week. 
This report must be filed for each plant operated 
by packers slaughtering over 125,000 animals an-
nually and purchasing cattle on a grid. The St. Jo-
seph office tabulates the reported data and issues 
a public report each Monday. The report contains 
essentially the same premium and discount cate-
gories and provides the weekly simple average 
                                                                                    
4 The AMS data collection procedure was verified by the authors via 
a personal phone call made on July 15, 2005, to the Des Moines, Iowa, 
office.  Fausti et al.  The Effect of the Livestock Mandatory Reporting Act on Market Transparency and Grid Price Dispersion   461 
 
 
and range for each category.
5 The St. Joseph of-
fice is not responsible for conducting formal plant 
audits. The USDA ARC (Audit, Review and Com-
pliance) office is responsible for conducting for-
mal audits (there are several auditors stationed in 
St. Joseph).
6 The structure of the new reporting 
regime suggests that the packing industry will be 
more diligent in providing accurate weekly pre-
mium and discount reports to the St. Joseph 
office. 
  The passage of MPR regulations altered the 
institutional structure of public price-reporting of 
grid premiums and discounts for slaughter cattle 
in two ways. First, all firms slaughtering 125,000 
cattle annually are mandated to report premiums 
and discounts for all grids on which they pur-
chase cattle at each plant. Consequently, the 
weekly data observations reported to the AMS 
under  MPR comprises approximately 90 percent 
of total U.S. steer and heifer slaughter (Perry et 
al. 2005, p. 10). Thus, MPR data covers a higher 
proportion of slaughter and is collected at the 
plant level as compared to VPR data collected at 
the firm level. Second, the ARC was given the 
right to audit the weekly reports submitted by 
firms. This is expected to change the behavior of 
reporting firms. Mandated packer reporting is ex-
pected to increase packer diligence in the re-
porting of data to the AMS and therefore increase 
the accuracy of information reported under MPR.
7 
 
Economic Implications of Regime Reform 
 
The Economic Research Service (Perry et al. 2005) 
investigated the effect of MPR on the quality of 
market information and unexpectedly found that 
(i) fed cattle formula prices tracked negotiated 
prices (including grid) closely (pp. 16–20), (ii) 
negotiated slaughter volume stabilized and even 
improved (pp. 21–24), and (iii) cattle price vola-
tility increased (pp. 27–30). 
                                                                                    
5 This is true for the LM_CT155 national report but the AMS also re-
leases a 5-area premium and discount report that is a weighted average 
of those plants located in the 5-area feeding region (LM_CT169). 
6 It is the view of the AMS that packing plants, post-MPR, are pro-
viding the actual premium and discount schedule they will be using for 
the coming week when the packers file their reports Monday morning. 
This statement is based on e-mail correspondence with an AMS market 
reporter. 
7 The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued a report 
(2005) on the effectiveness of the USDA to improve livestock market 
reporting under MPR. The report details the actions taken by the AMS 
to enforce packer compliance (appendices 2–4, pp. 28–46). 
 The  ERS lists a number of sources of potential 
data anomalies that may have affected the statisti-
cal quality of public price reports in the pre-MPR 
period: (i) bargaining behavior of buyers and sell-
ers varying from week to week, (ii) changes in 
animal quality from week to week, and (iii) the 
practice of AMS market reporters screening out 
transactions that appear to be outliers (Perry et al. 
2005, pp. 27–28). However, the ERS did not pro-
vide any conclusive evidence to suggest that these 
practices did bias pre-MPR reports. 
  Changes in bargaining behavior or animal qual-
ity evolve over time. Therefore, weekly changes 
in bargaining behavior or animal quality appear to 
be an unlikely explanation for the sudden and 
dramatic increase in grid price dispersion that oc-
curred after MPR implementation (Figure 1). 
  The third data anomaly raised by the ERS—the 
screening of outliers by market reporters—is un-
likely, but possible, in the case of AMS grid pre-
mium and discount reports in the pre-MPR period. 
AMS pre-MPR weekly grid price reports con-
tained only the mean and range for each grid cate-
gory. These summary statistics were based on a 
data collection procedure that used a weekly 
phone survey of a small set of packing firms. 
Therefore, the potential for AMS reporters to 
screen pre-MPR grid price data seems to be re-
mote given that (i) information being voluntarily 
provided to the AMS was already limited, and (ii) 
the sample size was already very small. The alter-
native possibility is that a type of self-selection 
reporting bias was introduced into the data col-
lection process because packers voluntarily pro-
vide grid premium and discount information to 
the  AMS that reflect firm-level data. As Feuz 
(1999) alluded to, packing firms adjust individual 
packing plant grid premium and discount sched-
ules with respect to regional market conditions. 
The AMS weekly survey did not capture this in-
tra-firm grid premium and discount dispersion. 
This type of sampling bias appears to be a func-
tion of the survey design. 
  The survey procedure used by the AMS to col-
lect grid premium and discount data suggests an 
alternative and more tractable hypothesis than the 
data anomaly supposition proposed by the ERS. 
We propose that the AMS employed a sampling 
procedure under VPR that may have resulted in a 
non-representative sample of packer pricing in-
tentions being used to provide data for weekly 
grid premium and discount reports. A non-repre-462    October 2010  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
sentative sampling mechanism is a plausible ex-
planation for increased grid premium and dis-
count dispersion in the post-MPR period. This 
supposition is hereafter referred to as “sample-
selection bias.” It is our view that sample-selec-
tion bias is the result of the institutional relation-
ship between the AMS and the packing industry 
during the pre-MPR era that limited the AMS’s 
ability to gain access to more detailed information. 
 Obviously,  MPR removed any sample-selection 
bias that may have been present during the pre-
MPR period.
8 Accordingly, it is safe to conclude 
that these reforms have enhanced the ability of 
the public price-reporting system to provide greater 
transparency under MPR. 
 
Empirical Hypothesis 
Implementation of MPR did increase the amount 
of transaction price information reported by each 
firm as well as the number of firms reporting 
transactions to the AMS. According to Azzam 
(2003), an increased level of transactions reported 
after implementation of MPR should reduce dis-
persion associated with weekly reports because of 
the inverse relationship between information flow 
and transaction price variability. Therefore, weekly 
grid premium and discount reports released by the 
AMS should provide greater market transparency 
under MPR because the standard deviation associ-
ated with the statistical average for grid premium 
and discount values being reported to the AMS 
will decrease as the number of packer grid price 
schedules being reported increases. Accordingly, 
a reduction in premium and discount uncertainty 
would be expected. This view is consistent with 
the literature on the thinning market (Tomek 1980). 
 The  transparency  discussion in the MPR litera-
ture implicitly assumes that the sample drawn 
from the population of transactions occurring in a 
week and reported to the AMS in the pre-MPR pe-
riod is representative. Therefore, the introduction 
of MPR should lower dispersion levels associated 
with grid premiums and discounts relative to 
                                                                                    
8 The GAO report (2005) criticized the AMS reporting procedures. The 
GAO examined AMS data from April to June of 2005, the period just 
prior to MPR expiring due to the sunset clause in the original legisla-
tion. It found that AMS market reporters were still excluding trans-
actions from official reports. The majority of the data screened were 
for live and dressed weight transactions associated with very small lots 
containing fewer than 10 head (appendices 2–4, pp. 28–46). The GAO 
did not report any evidence of grid premium or discount data being 
screened. 
VPR-era dispersion levels. However, if VPR dis-
persion estimators for weekly grid premium and 
discount values were affected by sample-selection 
bias, then it is possible that premium and discount 
dispersion levels would not decline or would pos-
sibly even increase as a result of MPR implemen-
tation. Hypothetically, a sampling technique that 
failed to capture the actual variation in actual pre-
mium and discounts being paid within and across 
firms could result in truncated dispersion meas-
ures being reported under VPR. This scenario was 
not considered in the MPR literature discussion. 
  Based on the discussion of transparency in the 
MPR literature, and assuming MPR did improve 
transparency, a proposition is proposed. 
  PROPOSITION 1: Assuming that the sampling technique 
used during the pre-MPR period produced a representa-
tive sample upon which grid price reports were based, 
then reform of the livestock price-reporting system will 
result in a decline in grid premium and discount disper-
sion levels. 
  Rejection of proposition 1 provides support for 
the supposition that grid price reports released 
during the VPR era were affected by a non-repre-
sentative sample selection procedure, i.e., a sam-
ple-selection bias. A series of statistical tests are 
conducted to determine if dispersion levels de-
clined as a result of MPR implementation. If the 
statistical tests indicate that dispersion levels have 
not declined, then sample-selection bias is a plau-
sible explanation for the coexistence of increased 
transparency and increased price dispersion. 
  It should be noted that the AMS never claimed 
that the weekly grid price reports released prior to 
MPR were statistically reliable. However, these 
reports were the only publically available infor-
mation on grid prices provided on a weekly basis. 
Accordingly, it is reasonable to assume that sell-
ers of fed cattle used these reports during their 
price discovery process. 
Empirical Methodology 
Let  ti χ   denote a grid premium or discount re-
ported by firm i (plant i after the implementation 
of MPR and assume n plants) for week t (assume 
m weeks). The weekly mean  t χ  and extreme val-
ues for each grid premium and discount catego-
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max max tt i i χ = χ , 
 
(3) 
min min tt i i χ = χ . 
 
 Suppose  MPR takes effect in the jth period and 
that j + k = m. The variable k represents the time 
interval in weeks after MPR implementation in 
period j. One measure of dispersion is the stan-
dard deviation (Sd). If  ti χ  is available, the stan-
dard deviation before and after the implementa-
tion of MPR can be calculated using standard sta-
tistical procedures (e.g., Newbold 1995, p. 243). 
 However,  only  t χ , 
max
t χ , and 
min
t χ  are avail-
able, and  ti χ  are unavailable. Therefore, the stan-
dard deviation is not derivable and thus cannot be 
used as a measure of intra-week price dispersion. 
However, this data limitation can be overcome. 
Three intra-week dispersion proxies can be ex-
tracted from the weekly AMS grid reports. These 
three dispersion proxies are described below. 
  In order to assess the dispersion difference 
before and after the implementation of MPR, we 




max min max( , ) tt t t t B =χ − χ χ − χ , 
 





















+ ∑ . 
 
Simple algebra shows that 
 
(7) 





after after BS d ≥ . 
 
  In other words, we can use the average of Bt as 
an upper bound for the standard deviation. The 
dispersion before and after MPR is compared by 








 If  BR is less than 1, this indicates that disper-
sion has increased after MPR takes effect, and 
vice versa. One drawback of this approach is that 
the distribution of the BR ratio is unknown, and 
therefore no significance value can be attached to 
the ratio. 
  The second and third proxies for dispersion are 
the statistical range [equation (10)] and an alter-
native version of the coefficient of variation 
[equation (11)]. The AMS provides the statistical 
range in its weekly reports. The coefficient of 
variation can be derived from the information 
provided in the AMS weekly reports. 
  Define the statistical range Rt and our proxy for 
















respectively. A common approximation, found in 
most introductory statistics textbooks, for the 
standard deviation of a random variable is the sta-
tistical range divided by two. Equation (11) pro-
vides a rough approximation for the coefficient of 
variation associated with grid premium and dis-
count categories during the VPR  and  MPR pe-
riods. 
  The test of equal dispersion can be conducted 
by using a regression procedure suggested by 
Wooldridge (2006). The following regression is 
fitted using the ordinary least squares method: 
 
(12)  01 tt t ZD = β+ β + µ .  
 
The variable Dt is a dummy shift variable, set to 
zero prior to MPR implementation, and set to one 
after  MPR implementation. The variable Zt de-
notes the dependent variable for three separate 
regressions. The dependent variables are (i) the 
range Rt, (ii) the coefficient of variation proxy Ct, 
and (iii) the upper-bound ratio Bt, defined previ-
ously. The focus is on the t-ratio of the coefficient 
β1. A significant t-ratio indicates that Zt changes 
substantially after the implementation of MPR. 464    October 2010  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
 These  regression-based  t tests are equivalent to 
the usual two-sample t test. Essentially, we are 
comparing the mean values of two samples sepa-
rated by the date of MPR. The information in the 
sample data is the range, the coefficient of varia-
tion, and the bound ratio. These variables can 
provide approximations for the standard deviation 
of the original weekly price data () ti χ collected 
by the AMS. 
 
Data 
Data on national slaughter cattle grid premiums 
and discounts for three quality categories (prime, 
select, and standard), four yield grade categories 
(Yg 1.0–2.0, Yg 2.0–2.5, Yg 4.0–5.0, and Yg > 
5.0), and four weight categories (Wt 400–500, Wt 
500–550, Wt 950–1000, and Wt > 1000) were 
collected from a weekly AMS publication (“Na-
tional Carcass Premiums and Discounts for Slaugh-
ter Steers and Heifers,” issues 1-1-97 through 9-
26-05). The VPR  period is from November 4, 
1996, through March 26, 2001. The MPR period 
runs from April 9, 2001, through September 26, 
2005, which is when the MPR legislation expired 
due to a sunset clause.
9 With the exception of Wt 
950–1000 and Wt > 1000, all of the grid category 
series consisted of 230 VPR observations and 234 
MPR observations. Grid series Wt 950–1000 and 
Wt > 1000 consisted of 229 VPR observations and 
234  MPR observations. Note that because yield 
grade categories Yg 2.5–3.0, Yg 3.0–3.5, and Yg 
3.5–4.00 were essentially par categories during 
the sample period with no or very small premiums 
or discounts, these series were not analyzed. 
 
Empirical Results 
Table 1 contains the upper-bound weekly mean 
estimates for the standard deviations associated 
with VPR and MPR, and the corresponding bound 
ratio for weekly grid premium and discount re-
ports. Bound ratios for all grid categories are less 
than 1, indicating that the mean value of the up-
per-bound proxy for intra-week post-MPR stan-
dard deviation increased for all categories ana-
lyzed relative to the pre-MPR period. Given that 
                                                                                    
9 See Fausti et al. (2007) for additional discussion on the expiration 
of  MPR in 2005. The legislation was reauthorized in October 2006. 
Reimplementation of the reporting requirements began July 15, 2008. 
Due to loss of legal authority, data selected for the analysis covers only 
the period prior to deauthorization. 
the distribution of a bound ratio is unknown, no 
significance value can be attached to these ratios. 
  Table 2 provides the weekly mean estimates for 
the statistical range and coefficient of variation 
proxy for grid premium and discount categories 
for both price-reporting regimes. Tables 1 and 2 
provide evidence that clearly demonstrates that all 
three of the statistical measures (statistical range, 
coefficient of variation, and upper bound for the 
standard deviation) indicate an increase in intra-
week grid premium and discount dispersion lev-
els in the period after MPR implementation. 
  Regression analysis is used to statistically test 
if regime change affected grid price dispersion 
levels. Results of two-sample tests based on the 
regression approach are reported in Table 3. The 
t-statistics associated with the shift variable in the 
regressions are significant for all three dispersion 
measures, for all grid categories, at the 99 percent 
level. This regression-based t test is equivalent to 
the usual two-sample t test, and a significant t 
ratio is analogous to rejecting the null hypothesis 
of equal dispersion measures. 
  Tables 2 and 3 provide empirical evidence indi-
cating that for each of the grid categories ana-
lyzed, the MPR dispersion proxies are signifi-
cantly higher relative to VPR levels. These results 
provide statistical evidence that the market infor-
mation contained in the grid category premiums 
and discount data series for the post-MPR period 
are significantly different from the information 
contained in the pre-MPR series. Since we know 
that the MPR grid premium series contains more 
accurate data on meat packers’ grid-pricing be-
havior, it can be reasonably concluded that grid 
premium and discount reports released during the 
VPR era lacked transparency. Furthermore, these 
results show that increased information flow and 
improved transparency due to the implementation 
of the MPR is compatible with higher premium 
and discount dispersion. 
  The discussion by Azzam (2003) and Perry et 
al. (2005) on the expected effect of MPR imple-
mentation on price dispersion clearly indicated 
that price dispersion was expected to decline. 
This expectation was based on the implicit as-
sumption that weekly reports issued during the 
VPR era were based on data drawn from a repre-
sentative sample. All of the statistical tests ap-
plied to dispersion proxies measuring absolute 
and relative dispersion levels suggest that disper-
sion increased for grid premiums and discounts.  Fausti et al.  The Effect of the Livestock Mandatory Reporting Act on Market Transparency and Grid Price Dispersion   465 
 
 
Table 1.  Statistical Mean of the Weekly Upper Bound
a and the Bound Ratio 
Grid Category  Before Implementation of MPR  After Implementation of MPR  Bound Ratio (BR) 
Prime    4.96  12.58  0.39 
Select    1.52    4.62  0.33 
Standard 10.14  12.66  0.80 
Yg 1.0–2.0    2.35    5.08  0.46 
Yg 2.0–2.5    1.15    2.82  0.41 
Yg 4.0–5.0    6.34    7.92  0.80 
Yg > 5.0    6.27    8.31  0.75 
Wt 400–500    9.62  18.25  0.53 
Wt 500–550    8.06  15.46  0.52 
Wt 950–1000    7.79  10.55  0.74 
Wt > 1000    9.68  12.96  0.75 















Coefficient of Variation (%)
MPR 
Prime 7.59  18.78  66.97  142.10 
Select 2.44 7.67  -19.65  -44.72 
Standard 16.59  20.35 -48.48  -60.21 
Yg 1.0–2.0  3.93  7.91 101.15  141.16 
Yg 2.0–2.5  2.01  4.41 113.41  134.25 
Yg 4.0–5.0  10.699  14.37 -35.62  -57.09 
Yg > 5.0  10.674  15.10  -26.27  -41.70 
Wt 400–500  17.14  34.74  -39.97  -76.93 
Wt 500–550  13.70  29.58  -39.61  -97.63 
Wt 950–1000  13.90  17.75  -43.84  -123.54 
Wt > 1000  17.10  23.51  -40.54  -68.33 
a Statistical range values are in US$ per hundredweight units. 
b Weekly average for coefficient of variation values were converted into percentage values. 
 
 
This suggests that in the pre-MPR period, weekly 
grid premium and discount values publicly re-
ported were based on a non-representative sample. 
  Is it possible that some other market influences 
are responsible for the statistical results we re-
ported? It can be an issue only if such influences 
coincided with the implementation of MPR and 
remained effective throughout the MPR period 
analyzed. Perry et al. (2005) looked at the bovine 
spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) scare and con-
cluded that the BSE events in the United States 
and Canada do not explain the increase in price 
volatility. Accordingly, we conclude that the in-
stitutional change that occurred within the public 
livestock market reporting system under MPR 
eliminated sample-selection bias, and this institu-466    October 2010  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
Table 3. Two-Sample T Test  
Grid Category  Statistical Range (Rt)  Coefficient of Variance (Ct) Bound  (Bt) 
Prime  24.85*    11.94*  21.29* 
Select 19.93*  -13.53*  19.34* 
Standard  9.75*    -7.90*  11.23* 
Yg 1.0–2.0  38.13*   21.62*  38.14* 
Yg 2.0–2.5  32.23*   10.60*  31.22* 
Yg 4.0–5.0  13.69*  -16.03*  10.04* 
Yg > 5.0  20.71*  -23.76*  13.80* 
Wt 400–500  88.79*  -59.92*  68.85* 
Wt 500–550  65.93*  -68.41*  50.78* 
Wt 950–1000  14.45*  -43.66*  15.94* 
Wt > 1000  21.96*  -28.38*  20.52* 
Note: All table values are “student t” test statistics, and “*” indicates the level of significance at the 99 percent level or greater. 




tional change appears to be the compelling expla-




An important question addressed in this paper is: 
Was the reform of the public price-reporting sys-
tem for slaughter cattle sold on a grid necessary? 
The answer to this question, based on empirical 
evidence, is yes. This conclusion is drawn from a 
series of stylized facts that can be gleaned from 
our discussion: 
 
  Implementation of MPR improved market transpar-
ency for publicly reported grid premiums and dis-
counts. 
  Implementation of MPR increased grid premium 
and discount volatility.  
  Implementation of MPR increased grid premium 
and discount dispersion.  
  A plausible explanation for increased grid price 
dispersion in the post-MPR period is that weekly 
premium and discount point estimators were de-
rived from a non-representative sample prior to 
MPR implementation. 
  MPR implementation was necessary for transparent 
public reporting of grid prices. 
 
  Our discussion and empirical analysis adds 
another dimension to the literature on the need for 
and the effectiveness of MPR regulations on the 
public reporting system for fed cattle markets 
(Fausti and Diersen 2004, Pendell and Schroeder 
2006, Fausti, Diersen, and Qasmi 2007). Prior to 
this study, there was a lack of robust statistical 
evidence indicating that the VPR system was in 
need of reform. Furthermore, increased price dis-
persion is a plausible explanation for the puzzling 
increase in price volatility reported by the ERS 
(Perry et al. 2005) in the live-weight and dressed-
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